DNSSEC checker
See whether a domain's DNSSEC chain of trust holds from the root down, and which link breaks when it does not.
Results for dnssec-failed.org
DNSSEC: Broken
The chain breaks at dnssec-failed.org.
The DS record at org (tag 42069) matches none of the keys the zone publishes. Resolvers that validate (Google, Cloudflare, Quad9) are refusing this name now.
All 3 answer SERVFAIL
How to fix it
Replace the DS
Give your registrar the DS for the key the zone uses now (KSK 50719):
dnssec-failed.org. 3600 IN DS 50719 13 2 D602C971A02AF89B7661B99D6DD1B9E2EC876617631D04F633902A42CD4D6BBDTurned DNSSEC off?
Remove the DS at your registrar. The name works again, unsigned, once the DS has expired from caches.
Re-sign
If KSK 42069 still exists in your signer, publish it and sign the key set with it again.
Chain of trust, 4 steps
- Root.Trust anchor
- KSK 20326 · RSA/SHA-256
- KSK 38696 · RSA/SHA-256
- ZSK 8763 · RSA/SHA-256
Two root KSKs are published during the planned root key rollover. That is normal.
ZSK 8763 signs the DS for org.
Valid for 13 days in total, 12 days left HoldsDS 725 · RSA/SHA-256 · SHA-256 · matches KSK 725
Top-level domainorgPass- KSK 725 · RSA/SHA-256
- KSK 26974 · RSA/SHA-256
- ZSK 11859 · RSA/SHA-256
- ZSK 25488 · RSA/SHA-256
ZSK 11859 signs the DS for dnssec-failed.org.
Valid for 21 days in total, 16 days leftNo key matches this DSDS 42069 · ECDSA P-256 · SHA-256 · no key has tag 42069
Your zonednssec-failed.orgBroken here- KSK 50719 · ECDSA P-256
- ZSK 32784 · ECDSA P-256
The keys the zone does publish are listed above. The DS points at none of them.
- AnswerSOA dnssec-failed.orgNot checked
Not checked: the chain broke above.
What public resolvers say
Our finding: no key matches the DS record. Resolvers report the same failure in different words. Ours comes from checking the keys.
| Resolver | Answer | Validated (AD) | Their reason |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cloudflare 1.1.1.1 | SERVFAIL | No | EDE 9: no SEP matching the DS found for dnssec-failed.org. |
| Google 8.8.8.8 | SERVFAIL | No | EDE 9: No DNSKEY matches DS RRs of dnssec-failed.org |
| Quad9 9.9.9.9 | SERVFAIL | No | EDE 6: DNSSEC Bogus |
With checking switched off (the CD bit) the answer comes back: the data is there, the chain is what fails.
- Look up the DS and DNSKEY recordsSee the raw records the chain uses.DS lookup
- Open the visualizerThe same check for dnssec-failed.org, drawn as a graph.Visualizer
- Has the DS change reached everyone?DNS propagation, type DS.Propagation
- What does the registry hold?WHOIS shows the DS data from RDAP.WHOIS
- Copy the graph dataNodes and edges as JSON.
Structured result (JSON) · 8.5 KB
{
"name": "dnssec-failed.org",
"zone": "dnssec-failed.org",
"type": "SOA",
"mode": "live",
"verdict": "bogus",
"state": "ds-no-match",
"verdictText": "The chain breaks at dnssec-failed.org.",
"explain": "The DS record at org (tag 42069) matches none of the keys the zone publishes. Resolvers that validate (Google, Cloudflare, Quad9) are refusing this name now.",
"anchor": {
"kind": "iana-root",
"keyTag": 20326,
"algorithm": 8
},
"chain": [
{
"zone": ".",
"role": "root",
"status": "ok",
"keys": [
{
"tag": 20326,
"flags": 257,
"role": "ksk",
"algorithm": 8,
"bits": 2048,
"anchor": true
},
{
"tag": 38696,
"flags": 257,
"role": "ksk",
"algorithm": 8,
"bits": 2048,
"anchor": true
},
{
"tag": 8763,
"flags": 256,
"role": "zsk",
"algorithm": 8,
"bits": 2048
}
],
"dnskeySig": {
"by": 38696,
"valid": true,
"expires": "2026-12-01T00:00Z",
"lifetimeDays": 21,
"lifetimeHours": 504,
"leftHours": 340.2
},
"link": null,
"servers": []
},
{
"zone": "org",
"role": "tld",
"status": "ok",
"keys": [
{
"tag": 725,
"flags": 257,
"role": "ksk",
"algorithm": 8,
"bits": 2048,
"anchor": true
},
{
"tag": 26974,
"flags": 257,
"role": "ksk",
"algorithm": 8,
"bits": 2048
},
{
"tag": 11859,
"flags": 256,
"role": "zsk",
"algorithm": 8,
"bits": 1024
},
{
"tag": 25488,
"flags": 256,
"role": "zsk",
"algorithm": 8,
"bits": 1024
}
],
"dnskeySig": {
"by": 725,
"valid": true,
"expires": "2026-11-30T17:09Z",
"lifetimeDays": 21,
"lifetimeHours": 506,
"leftHours": 333.4
},
"link": {
"status": "ok",
"word": "Holds",
"text": "DS 725 · RSA/SHA-256 · SHA-256 · matches KSK 725",
"ds": [
{
"tag": 725,
"algorithm": 8,
"digestType": 2,
"matches": 725
}
],
"signedBy": 8763,
"expires": "2026-11-29T17:00Z",
"lifetimeHours": 313,
"leftHours": 309.2
},
"servers": []
},
{
"zone": "dnssec-failed.org",
"role": "zone",
"status": "broken",
"keys": [
{
"tag": 50719,
"flags": 257,
"role": "ksk",
"algorithm": 13,
"bits": 256
},
{
"tag": 32784,
"flags": 256,
"role": "zsk",
"algorithm": 13,
"bits": 256
}
],
"dnskeySig": null,
"link": {
"status": "broken",
"word": "No key matches this DS",
"text": "DS 42069 · ECDSA P-256 · SHA-256 · no key has tag 42069",
"ds": [
{
"tag": 42069,
"algorithm": 13,
"digestType": 2,
"matches": null
}
],
"signedBy": 11859,
"expires": "2026-12-03T00:23Z",
"lifetimeHours": 506,
"leftHours": 388.6
},
"servers": []
}
],
"denial": null,
"issues": [
{
"id": "ds-no-match",
"level": "fail",
"step": 2,
"evidence": "None of the DNSKEY records of dnssec-failed.org matches a DS record published by the parent.",
"rfc": "RFC 4035 5",
"fix": "Replace the DS at your registrar with the one for the key the zone uses now: dnssec-failed.org. 3600 IN DS 50719 13 2 D602C971A02AF89B7661B99D6DD1B9E2EC876617631D04F633902A42CD4D6BBD"
}
],
"extras": {
"cds": false,
"cdnskey": false,
"nsec3param": null,
"walkable": false,
"suggestedDs": "dnssec-failed.org. 3600 IN DS 50719 13 2 D602C971A02AF89B7661B99D6DD1B9E2EC876617631D04F633902A42CD4D6BBD"
},
"rdap": {
"dsData": [
{
"tag": 42069
}
],
"matchesZone": true
},
"resolvers": [
{
"name": "Cloudflare 1.1.1.1",
"ip": "1.1.1.1",
"ad": false,
"rcode": "SERVFAIL",
"ede": "EDE 9: no SEP matching the DS found for dnssec-failed.org.",
"cdRcode": "NOERROR"
},
{
"name": "Google 8.8.8.8",
"ip": "8.8.8.8",
"ad": false,
"rcode": "SERVFAIL",
"ede": "EDE 9: No DNSKEY matches DS RRs of dnssec-failed.org",
"cdRcode": "NOERROR"
},
{
"name": "Quad9 9.9.9.9",
"ip": "9.9.9.9",
"ad": false,
"rcode": "SERVFAIL",
"ede": "EDE 6: DNSSEC Bogus",
"cdRcode": "NOERROR"
}
],
"graph": {
"nodes": [
{
"id": "z0-ksk-20326",
"kind": "ksk",
"zone": ".",
"label": "KSK 20326",
"tag": 20326,
"status": "ok",
"row": 0,
"zoneIndex": 0
},
{
"id": "z0-ksk-38696",
"kind": "ksk",
"zone": ".",
"label": "KSK 38696",
"tag": 38696,
"status": "ok",
"row": 1,
"zoneIndex": 0
},
{
"id": "z0-zsk-8763",
"kind": "zsk",
"zone": ".",
"label": "ZSK 8763",
"tag": 8763,
"status": "ok",
"row": 2,
"zoneIndex": 0
},
{
"id": "z1-ds-725",
"kind": "ds",
"zone": "org",
"label": "DS 725",
"tag": 725,
"status": "ok",
"row": 0,
"zoneIndex": 1
},
{
"id": "z1-ksk-725",
"kind": "ksk",
"zone": "org",
"label": "KSK 725",
"tag": 725,
"status": "ok",
"row": 1,
"zoneIndex": 1
},
{
"id": "z1-ksk-26974",
"kind": "ksk",
"zone": "org",
"label": "KSK 26974",
"tag": 26974,
"status": "ok",
"row": 2,
"zoneIndex": 1
},
{
"id": "z1-zsk-11859",
"kind": "zsk",
"zone": "org",
"label": "ZSK 11859",
"tag": 11859,
"status": "ok",
"row": 3,
"zoneIndex": 1
},
{
"id": "z1-zsk-25488",
"kind": "zsk",
"zone": "org",
"label": "ZSK 25488",
"tag": 25488,
"status": "ok",
"row": 4,
"zoneIndex": 1
},
{
"id": "z2-ds-42069",
"kind": "ds",
"zone": "dnssec-failed.org",
"label": "DS 42069",
"tag": 42069,
"status": "broken",
"row": 0,
"zoneIndex": 2
},
{
"id": "z2-ksk-50719",
"kind": "ksk",
"zone": "dnssec-failed.org",
"label": "KSK 50719",
"tag": 50719,
"status": "skipped",
"row": 1,
"zoneIndex": 2
},
{
"id": "z2-zsk-32784",
"kind": "zsk",
"zone": "dnssec-failed.org",
"label": "ZSK 32784",
"tag": 32784,
"status": "skipped",
"row": 2,
"zoneIndex": 2
},
{
"id": "z2-rr-SOA",
"kind": "rr",
"zone": "dnssec-failed.org",
"label": "SOA",
"status": "skipped",
"row": 3,
"zoneIndex": 2
}
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "z0-ksk-20326",
"to": "z0-zsk-8763",
"kind": "signs",
"status": "ok"
},
{
"from": "z1-ds-725",
"to": "z1-ksk-725",
"kind": "digest",
"status": "ok"
},
{
"from": "z1-ksk-725",
"to": "z1-zsk-11859",
"kind": "signs",
"status": "ok"
},
{
"from": "z1-ksk-725",
"to": "z1-zsk-25488",
"kind": "signs",
"status": "ok"
},
{
"from": "z0-zsk-8763",
"to": "z1-ds-725",
"kind": "delegates",
"status": "ok"
},
{
"from": "z2-ds-42069",
"to": "z2-ksk-50719",
"kind": "digest",
"status": "broken"
},
{
"from": "z2-ksk-50719",
"to": "z2-zsk-32784",
"kind": "signs",
"status": "skipped"
},
{
"from": "z1-zsk-11859",
"to": "z2-ds-42069",
"kind": "delegates",
"status": "broken"
},
{
"from": "z2-rr-SOA",
"to": "z2-rr-SOA",
"kind": "signs",
"status": "skipped"
}
],
"folded": 0
}
}More in DNS · Health checks
Next step
- DNS traceFollow the lookup from the root to see where it breaksCheck dnssec-failed.org in DNS trace
- DNS health checkAre the name servers and records healthy?Check dnssec-failed.org in DNS health check
- DNS lookupRead the raw DS and DNSKEY recordsCheck dnssec-failed.org in DNS lookup
What the DNSSEC check looks at
DNSSEC signs DNS answers so a resolver can tell they were not changed on the way. The signatures only help when every link holds: the root vouches for the top-level domain, the top-level domain vouches for your zone with a DS record, and your zone signs its own records.
This page walks that chain one zone at a time and asks each authoritative server directly. It starts from the IANA root key, checks the DS record at each parent against the keys the child publishes, checks the signature on every key set, and then checks the signature on the answer for the record type you chose.
- Secure: every link holds, from the root to the answer.
- Insecure: the parent says the zone is not signed. Most domains are in this state, and it is a choice, not a fault.
- Broken: a link fails, so resolvers that validate refuse the name. The page names the link and the fix.
- Could not tell: we could not finish, for example because no server answered or the zone uses an algorithm we cannot verify here.
How to read the result
The chain of trust is a list of cards from the root to the answer. Each card shows the keys the zone publishes (a key signing key, KSK, and a zone signing key, ZSK), the DS record that joins it to its parent, and a bar for how long its signatures live and how much of that is left.
A signature that lives only a day or two is not a warning. Some providers sign on the fly and renew all the time. We warn only when a signature that lives a week or more has less than a fifth of its life left, or when a signature has already expired.
Below the chain, a table shows what Cloudflare, Google and Quad9 make of the name: whether they set the AD bit (authenticated data) and what error they give. Resolvers describe the same failure in different words, so our own finding comes first.
Fixing a broken chain
The most common outage is a DS record at the registrar that no longer matches any key in the zone. It follows a move to a new DNS provider, a key rollover that went wrong, or switching signing off without removing the DS.
- Find the failing linkThe card marked "Broken here" shows the DS record next to the keys the zone really publishes, and says why they do not match.
- Choose the fixReplace the DS at your registrar with the one for the key the zone uses now, remove the DS if you turned DNSSEC off, or re-sign with the key the DS points to.
- Wait, then check againResolvers keep the old DS until its time to live runs out. Run the check again, and use DNS propagation to see whether the change has reached everyone.
Turning DNSSEC on
An unsigned domain still works for everyone. Turning DNSSEC on is a decision for the owner, and it needs two parties: the DNS provider signs the zone, and the registrar publishes a DS record at the parent.
- Switch on signing at the DNS provider that hosts the zone. Providers that sign for you give you a DS record to copy.
- Add that DS record at your registrar, using the same values: key tag, algorithm, digest type and digest.
- Run this check. A result of "Secure" means every link holds. Keep the DS in step with the provider whenever you change keys or move the zone.
For the records themselves, use a DS lookup and a DNSKEY lookup. For the rest of a domain, see the DNS health check and the DNS trace.
Questions people ask
What does insecure mean for a domain?
It means the domain is not signed with DNSSEC and the parent says so on purpose. Most domains are in this state and it is not an error. Anyone can still look the name up.
Why do some resolvers fail while others work?
Resolvers that validate DNSSEC refuse a name whose chain is broken. Resolvers that do not validate still answer, so the problem looks random. The table of public resolvers shows who refuses and why.
Why does my domain fail on only one name server?
A stale secondary can serve old signatures that have expired while the others are fine. People whose resolver asks that server get a failure and the rest do not. The server list on the zone card flags it.
Can I test a new DNS provider before I upload the DS?
Yes. Turn on "Before I upload a DS" in the options and list up to four servers. We ask only those servers, check the signatures, and print the DS record to give your registrar.
What is a trust anchor and can I change it?
A trust anchor is the key a check starts from. We use the IANA root key. In the options you can paste a DS record in presentation format to start from your own, which is useful for testing a zone on its own.
Which algorithms can you verify?
RSA with SHA-256 and SHA-512, ECDSA P-256 and P-384 and Ed25519, plus RSA with SHA-1, which we flag as outdated. A zone that uses only something else is reported as could not tell, never as broken.
Does the check change anything at my registrar or DNS provider?
No. It only reads public DNS data, asks three public resolvers what they see, and, for a registered domain, reads the registry record to compare its DS data.
Use it from AI, the API or the command line
Every LookupOwl tool is also a free API and an MCP tool, with no key and no account. This one is dnssec_check. Please be kind to the rate limits.
curl "https://lookupowl.com/api/v1/tools/dnssec-check?q=cloudflare.com"claude mcp add --transport http lookupowl https://lookupowl.com/mcp